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ess: gerry@sphsu.mrc.aSummary The health of populations is determined more by the social and
economic determinants of health than by changes in technology, health services or
short-term policy interventions. In the near future, there is likely to be a signiﬁcant
shortfall in energy supply, resulting in high energy prices and a reversal of many of
the aspects of globalization that are currently taken for granted. If this happens,
economic recession and restructuring could have a negative impact on health, not
dissimilar to that experienced by the former Soviet Union when it attempted a rapid
change in its economy. There is, however, the potential, through economic planning
and sustainable development, to reduce the adverse effects of this change and use
this opportunity to impact on a range of diseases which are, at least in part, caused
by overconsumption, inequality and loss of community.Introduction
Throughout history, the health of populations has
been altered more by economic and social change
operating over decades than by short-term policy
interventions.1 However, the discourse of the
medical profession remains dominated by technical
innovations, reﬁnement of treatment regimes and
short-term policy debates. In contrast, inevitableocial and Public Health
sgow G12 8RZ, UK.
c.uk (G. McCartney).changes in the supply and demand of global energy
and climate change have the potential to cause
impacts on health that will eclipse the relevance of
most other current health debates. Climate change
has now forced its way on to the health agenda.2,3
A less recognized threat is known as ‘peak oil’ or
‘Hubbert’s blip’, which is set to bring the age of
cheap oil to an end in the near future.4 This will
occur not when oil runs out, but after only half of
the oil reserves have been used; the production
peak. This is likely to have a large negative and
sustained impact on Western economies in the
future, as multiple facets of these societies are
built upon the cheap availability of oil.5 Through
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ling availability of energy resources is likely to be
one of the biggest challenges for public health in
the foreseeable future.Peak oil
The concern that health is likely to be compromised
by an economic shock related to oil scarcity is
based upon the growing mismatch between oil
discovery and production (Fig. 1).6 When oil was
ﬁrst drilled, it was close to the surface, under high
pressure and of good quality. Since then, the most
proﬁtable sources have been used up, leaving only
the more difﬁcult, expensive and lower quality
sources. This is not restricted to crude oil, but
includes natural gas, many minerals and substrates
such as uranium.7,8 The debate should centre on
‘when’ and ‘how quick the decline’, rather than ‘if’
for ﬁnite resources such as these.
This mismatch phenomenon can be illustrated by
observing the trend of oil discovery and production
for individual countries. In the UK, there has been
signiﬁcant publicity over the fact that North Sea
gas output is now insufﬁcient to meet domestic
demand, resulting in a requirement to import gas
from Asia.9 A further example is the recent report
that oil production in Kuwait has peaked.10 Indeed,
one of the protagonists in this ﬁeld has recently
illustrated the consecutive peaks in oil production
experienced in a range of major oil-producing
countries.
Although this peaking of resource production in
some countries may be of local concern, it is only
when global production peaks, or where there are
trading difﬁculties, that economic consequences0
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Figure 1 The growing gap betweeare likely. Oil reserves will not suddenly ‘run out’,
but are likely to decline gradually and irreversibly.
From this point of peak production, prices will rise
inexorably and quickly until demand is reduced or
alternatives are found.
There are historical precedents for a mismatch of
this magnitude. In 1973, following the Yom Kippur
war, the ﬁrst OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries) production restriction of
under 10% resulted in a greater than three-fold
increase in the price of oil.11 As a result of the oil
price rise, there was a massive increase in govern-
ment debt in both developed and poor countries
(through the recycling of so-called ‘petrodollars’).
This, combined with further oil production restric-
tions during the 1970s, resulted in massive de-
industrialization in Europe as the competitive
advantage of oil-importing countries vanished.
Arguably, the current oil dependency is more
signiﬁcant, and the price rises are likely to be far
higher than seen previously. The scale of this
historical price rise was tempered by an increase
in exploration and oil discovery which increased the
supply of oil. This successful outcome has led to
some complacent thinking about the likely impact
of a peak oil scenario. The situation we face today
is different for several reasons. Demand for oil is
higher today than in the 1970s and is rising, existing
oilﬁelds have already peaked, and new supplies are
expensive and require input of increasing amounts
to extract from the ground. These factors alone will
lead to continuing escalation in the oil price.
However, many observers also argue that even
when unconventional sources of oil, like Canadian
oil shale, are taken into account, there is still no
prospect that future output of oil can meet current
or projected demands. This will lead to sustained
price rises.86
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ARTICLE IN PRESSThe projected rapid rise in oil prices in the future
will be driven not only by a supply shortfall, but
also by continuing increases in demand.12 This will
occur because of economic development in coun-
tries like China and India, and also because of the
dependence of the Western economies on motor
vehicles, aviation and a supply of commodities,
manufactures and food which come from China,
India and other developing economies.Peak oil debate
The challenge of peak oil is not universally
accepted in the scientiﬁc community or amongst
policy makers.13 Those proposing that we need not
be overly concerned make a number of arguments.
As oil prices rise, this incentivizes the development
of alternative and more efﬁcient sources of energy,
and demand is reduced. Thus supply always meets
demand and the market will allocate resources to
cover unmet need. This is a serious objection and
needs to be addressed.
It is true that the market will indeed make
currently uneconomical alternative sources of
energy more competitive as oil prices rise. Eco-
nomic forces will also drive efﬁciencies. For
example, the world’s massive supplies of coal could
be converted into oil. However, this is an energy
intensive and therefore expensive activity. More
importantly, were we to adopt this process, it
would almost guarantee a catastrophic rise in
greenhouse gases with accompanying climate
chaos.14
All other alternatives simply generate electricity,
which is useful for heating and limited forms of
transport but is no substitute for the driving energy
of the globalized economy, oil. There is no known
alternative energy source that will provide a
portable, cheap and concentrated source for motor
cars and aviation. There are multitudes of problems
to be overcome with other suggested alternatives
such as nuclear, which would require conversion of
its energy into another form for use in vehicles, and
requires an ongoing supply of uranium which is
another ﬁnite resource that is also subject to
peaking. The much vaunted hydrogen economy is
merely an energy medium rather than source, and
it is an inefﬁcient and expensive method for
transport use.
Others seek to champion bio-fuels. Oil, gas and
other fossil fuels were formed over a period of
millions of years from crushed micro-organisms,
and can essentially be thought of as concentrated
solar energy stored in the earth’s crust. As a resultof the extended period of time necessary to
produce this resource, it can be thought of as a
one-off and ﬁnite endowment. It is for this reason
that bio-fuels will be unable to ﬁll the energy gap,
since they derive their energy from a single year of
solar output and so could provide only a fraction of
the energy contained within fossil fuels, even if
bio-fuel farming covered all of the cultivatable land
on the globe. There is already pressure on food
production because of the shift to biofuels.15
It is clear that oil cannot be replaced as a cheap
form of energy, but it is equally indispensable as
the substrate for many industrial processes, most
signiﬁcantly fertilizers and plastics. There does not
seem to be any obvious alternative raw material
available for these needs.
Sceptics also make the point that, since as early
as 1913, there have been a number of projections
that oil production will peak, all of which have
proved to be incorrect.16 However, the evidence for
an oil production peak is more robust now than in
the past, as peak discovery is recognized to have
occurred some 40 years ago. This is a crucial point,
as previous ‘scare stories’ surrounding an oil
production peak were never supported by evidence
of an oil discovery peak. This evidence is now
available and validates concerns surrounding a
production peak.
The amount of oil ultimately recoverable from
the earth is closely linked to the level of invest-
ment in drilling and reﬁning technologies.17 This
variability inhibits accurate comparisons of future
oil reserves, but even the oil industry has started to
acknowledge the problem:
‘The fact is, the world has been ﬁnding less oil
than it’s been using for 20 years now. Not only has
demand been soaring, but the oil we’ve been
ﬁnding is coming from places that are tough to
reach. At the same time, more of this newly
discovered oil is of the type that requires a greater
investment to reﬁne. And because demand for this
precious resource will grow, according to some, by
over 40% by 2025, fuelling the world’s growing
economic prosperity will take a lot more energy
from every source’ (Chevron advertisement in The
Economist 1/10/05).
Therefore, there is evidence that a global peak in
oil production is inevitable and imminent, and that
economies around the world will go into recession if
unprepared. What is in doubt is the timing and the
rapidity of change. The permanence and scale of
the scarcity in oil would be likely to have far more
widespread effects than those seen during the
1970s, as the economies of most Western countries
around the world have become orientated towards
‘globalization’.
ARTICLE IN PRESSA reversal of globalization
Globalization can mean many things such as a rapid
transfer and sharing of information, cheap and
reliable telecommunications across the globe, or
trade and subspecialization of industry combined
with massive international capital ﬂows (global
capitalism). Some of these are unlikely to be
affected directly by oil scarcity (information ﬂows
and telecommunications), but the mechanisms of
global capitalism and the associated continuous
economic growth trend will be disrupted pro-
foundly.
Signiﬁcant oil price rises will reduce the feasi-
bility of international trade for goods and services
reliant on aviation, shipping and motor vehicles.
Currently, the UK is a service-led economy
which trades for the vast majority of its primary
and manufactured goods including foodstuffs.
The competitive advantage enjoyed by the UK
which supports this will be reduced massively in
a peak-oil-induced global depression. Thus, the
economic fundamentals of the UK will be in
jeopardy.
Looking more deeply, much economic and social
development over the last 100 years has been
based on the availability of cheap oil. This includes:
the production of fertilizer which supports inten-
sive farming techniques; the ‘just-in-time’ retail
trade and its massive truck ﬂeet; and the out-of-
town shopping centres and suburbia developed
without need for public transport. Almost every
aspect of the society in which we live is currently
dependent either directly or indirectly on the
availability of cheap oil. It is worth mentioning
that the USA is, arguably, in a far worse situation,Year
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Figure 2 The effect of economic recession on life expectanc
HFA Database, January 2006.)with cities such as Las Vegas built without
contemplation of a post-cheap-oil world.Geopolitical implications
Perhaps the most concerning aspects of the peak oil
phenomenon are the potential implications for
international relations. There is a widespread
belief that wars for oil resources are already
underway, and this is prior to the production peak.
Under a peak oil scenario, the competition for oil
resources is likely to be even greater, particularly in
oil-dependent countries such as the USA, UK and
China. The impact that this may have for interna-
tional relations (particularly with the Middle East)
and the potential for war is not insigniﬁcant.
Even within countries, it is likely that the most
vulnerable in any society will be most susceptible
to the fall-out, as was illustrated in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. This, there-
fore, has the potential to widen inequalities in all
spheres at a time when society will be least able to
support those in greatest need.Economics and the creation of health
It is known that economic growth creates health,
and recession destroys health. Historical data have
shown that economic growth is the most important
associated factor in determining health improve-
ment.18,19 There is also evidence that economic
shocks destroy health, as was seen in the health
trends of the population in the former Soviet98
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lization in the 1970s and 1980s.23Wealth inequalities
Moreover, it is known that both absolute and
relative levels of income have a substantial impact
on health. There is, however, a continuing debate
over the extent and generalizability of these
ﬁndings.24,25 It can be concluded, however, that
any reduction in absolute income levels will be
detrimental to health, and any associated increase
in income inequality will have an additional
negative effect.Health in a society of plenty
There is a common pattern of health and illness in
societies of plenty. Life expectancy is long, with
low rates of serious infectious disease and improv-
ing survival from many previously fatal illnesses
such as cancer. However, the burden of chronic
disease continues to rise, measures of well-being
are at best static,26 and concerns are increasing
about the prevalence of sexually transmitted
infections, alcohol and drug abuse, obesity and
mental illness. Public health is currently focused on
these challenges, but there is a need to re-evaluate
these priorities. Problems such as obesity and loss
of well-being are, arguably, the product of a
consumerist society built on cheap oil.27,28
Health effects of peak oil
It is likely that the main health effects of peak
oil will be driven by the consequences of an
economic downturn. The effects of unemployment,
de-industrialization, and absolute and relative
poverty would be likely to mirror those seen in
the former Soviet Union from 1989 and in indus-
trialized areas of Europe from the late 1970s. The
mechanisms of social and stress-induced illness are
now recognized.29 We could therefore reasonably
expect a dip in life expectancy in the UK for the
ﬁrst time since the end of World War 1 if such an
economic shock were to occur.Positive aspects of peak oil
The economic impact would only be one aspect of
the forces acting upon human health in a peak oil
scenario. The availability of individual motorizedtransport is likely to be lessened, reducing the
pressure on climate change after a substantial
lag time. Pollution-driven respiratory illness, road
trafﬁc accidents and the obesity epidemic are all
likely to be affected positively by the population
increasingly beginning to cycle and walk.30
There will be an opportunity to move away from
the proﬁt-driven, stress-laden globalized system to
which we have become accustomed, and this could
impact on well-being through a range of inter-
mediate factors such as changing work patterns or
increased local community co-operation.Options for action
The essence of the problem of peak oil will be a
lack of preparation for a future society in which oil
will, at ﬁrst, become increasingly expensive and
then play only a marginal role. Although planning at
individual and policy level could reduce negative
effects, it is unlikely, given current trends, that
market mechanisms alone will allocate resources in
the interests of population health. The likely result
is increasing inequality and geopolitical unrest.
At individual level, decisions could be taken to
increase preparedness relating to employment,
energy efﬁciency, lifestyle and transport. Industry
could examine their reliance on oil-based products
at all stages of their business, and carry out
scenario planning to ensure their sustainability.
However, policy makers will have a crucial role in
creating a sustainable society through the creation
of pre-conditions to make these sustainable deci-
sions possible. This would span areas such as energy
and transport policy, town planning, and the wider
structure of the economy. This is applicable at the
level of the nation state, but also at international
level through structures such as the European
Union.
Although there is a rising tide of awareness about
climate change, at present, there are no indica-
tions that even the most obvious impacts of peak oil
have been considered in the UK, such as with air
travel. There is therefore some way to go before
there is general acceptance of the need to change
policy direction, or of the actions required.Conclusions
There is now good evidence that an oil discovery
peak occurred more than 40 years ago. It is,
therefore, reasonable to expect an oil production
peak to occur in the next few years. Although
ARTICLE IN PRESSgovernment plans and market adaptations may
mitigate the worst effects of this change, peak oil
could eclipse all other determinants of health in
the not-too-distant future. Health professionals are
among the many groups that should address this
threat urgently.
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